Over 300 government members have had the main responsibility for international development cooperation in 23 member countries of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee since the organization started reporting detailed Official Development Assistance (ODA) data in 1967. Understanding their role in foreign aid giving is crucial since their decisions might directly impact aid effectiveness and thus economic development on the ground. Our study examines whether development ministers' personal characteristics influence aid budgets and aid quality. To this end, we create a novel database on development ministers' gender, political ideology, prior professional experience in development cooperation, education in economics, and time in office over the 1967-2012 period. Results from fixed-effects panel regressions show that some of the personal characteristics of development ministers matter. Most notably, we find that more experienced ministers with respect to their time in office obtain larger aid budgets. Moreover, there is evidence that female ministers as well as officeholders with prior professional experience in development cooperation and a longer time in office provide higher-quality ODA. JEL classification: D78, F35, H11, O19
INTRODUCTION
During the run up to Germany's 2009 General Elections, the Free Democratic Party campaigned for the abolishment of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. When Chancellor Angela Merkel formed a coalition with the Free Democrats later that year, it was a frontrunner of the Free Democratic Party who took office in the ministry: Dirk Niebel, then the party's General Secretary. Rather than sticking to the announcement to dissolve the ministry, the new minister asked for an increase in the ministry's budget. 1 while in most cases development aid has been the responsibility of the foreign minister. 18 percent of the ministers have been women and a mere 16 percent possessed any professional experience in development cooperation when they took office. While it is highly disputed whether (and how) aggregate aid affects the economic growth of developing countries (e.g., Burnside and Dollar 2000; Easterly, Levine and Roodman 2004) , 4 there is evidence that certain types of aid have positive effects on development outcomes Clemens et al. 2011; Bjørnskov 2013 ; but see also Roodman 2015) . Moreover, scholarship has shed light on some unwelcome side-effects aid might have on conflict, governance, and sustainable development in general (e.g., Elbadawi et al. 2008; Bjørnskov 2010; Nunn and Qian 2013) . Understanding the role played by development ministers in foreign aid is crucial since their decisions might influence both the quantity and the quality of aid and thus impact aid effectiveness and aggravate or mitigate potential side-effects of aid.
In order to study how the personal characteristics of development ministers affect donors' aid giving, we build a novel database covering all ministers responsible for development cooperation since 1 DIE WELT, "Neuer Minister: Niebel verlangt mehr Geld für Entwicklungshilfe," WELT. de, 23 November 2009 , available at http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article5297548/Niebel-verlangt-mehr-Geld-fuer-Entwicklungshilfe.html (accessed 26 November 2014). 2 Christ, Sebastian and Hans-Peter Schütz, "Entwicklungshilfeministerium: Dirk Niebel, Minister auf Bewährung," stern. de, 29 October 2009 (own translation), available at http://www.stern. de/politik/deutschland/entwicklungshilfeministerium-dirk-niebel-minister-auf-bewaehrung-1517745.html (accessed 26 November 2014) . 3 As of the end of 2012, 23 countries (and the European Commission) were members of the OECD-DAC: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We only cover aid provided by DAC donors in order to analyze a rather homogenous set of countries, often called "traditional" donor countries. 4 See Doucouliagos and Paldam (2009) for a meta study of the aid effectiveness literature. 1967 . The study covers all country-years for which detailed aid flows have been reported to the OECD-DAC (as of July 28, 2014). Using panel econometric models, we then estimate the impact of development ministers' personal characteristics on (1) aid quantity, i.e., the size of aid budgets in terms of Official Development Assistance (ODA), 5 and (2) aid quality, i.e., the share of aid budgets that is expected to be particularly conducive to achieving developmental goals as operationalized by the foreign-assistance component of the Commitment to Development Index (CDI) .
Specifically, we test whether these two variables are affected by the ministers' gender, ideology, prior professional experience in development cooperation, university education in economics, and years in office.
Our paper combines two strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the empirical aid literature (e.g., Dudley 1979; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Kuziemko and Werker 2006) and to the scholarly work on aid budgets in particular (e.g., Bertoli et al. 2008; Tingley 2010; Dreher and Fuchs 2011; Brech and Potrafke 2014; Fuchs et al. 2014 ). Second, the paper adds to the burgeoning literature on the effects of political leaders' personal characteristics on economic outcomes. Previous research has focused on the role of gender (e.g., Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Koch and Fulton 2011) , political ideology (e.g., Neuenkirch and Neumeier 2013) , educational and professional background (e.g., Göhlmann and Vaubel 2007; Dreher et al. 2009; Spilimbergo 2009 ), regional and ethnic origin (e.g., Hodler and Raschky 2013; De Luca et al. 2015) , socioeconomic status (Hayo and Neumeier 2012 , and time in office (e.g., Jochimsen and Thomasius 2014; Moessinger 2014) .
Contributions cover the role played by country leaders (e.g., Dreher et al. 2009; Besley et al. 2011) , foreign ministers and defense ministers (Koch and Fulton 2011) , finance ministers (Jochimsen and Thomasius 2012; Moessinger 2014) , central bankers (e.g., Göhlmann and Vaubel 2007; Neuenkirch and Neumeier 2013) , heads of subnational regions Neumeier 2012, 2014) , and mayors (e.g., Freier and Thomasius 2012; Ferreira and Gyourko 2014) , among others. 6 The development minister offers a particularly interesting case to reinvestigate the role of leadership since this position receives relatively little (domestic) attention compared to other cabinet members, such as the head of government, the minister of finance, or the minister of defense, despite its global importance. Development ministers have a low profile at home, usually being either annexed 5 ODA is defined by the OECD (2008) as "those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients (available at www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist) and to multilateral development institutions which are: i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent)." 6 A related literature analyzes how leadership changes (rather than personal characteristics) affect economic outcomes. See, for example, McGillivray and Smith (2004) for the impact on trade, Jones and Olken (2005) for growth effects, Moser and Dreher (2010) for reactions of financial markets, and Dreher and Jensen (2013) for the role in voting alignment in the United Nations General Assembly.
to their respective foreign ministry or having a low rank in cabinet. 7 In those cases in which the development minister is appointed as foreign minister, as in Japan and the United States, it appears likely that the office holders are selected based on their stance on broader foreign policy and security issues rather than on their development profile. In sharp contrast to the disinterest in development issues in many governments, parliaments and the general public, aid decisions taken at donor ministries can have huge impacts on the ground as DAC countries alone provide more than US$ 100 billion annually to the developing world. Our analysis thus adds to the study of the role of political leadership by examining a high-impact but low-profile government position.
The previous literature barely touches on the role of the decision-makers responsible for the provision of development assistance-despite the large consequences that their decisions might have on aid effectiveness and the (unwelcome) side-effects of aid. The existing papers that cover the role of development ministers only analyze the impact of the ministers' gender. Dreher et al. (2015a) find that female development ministers are more responsive to gender issues when allocating aid than their male counterparts. Kleemann et al. (2014) discover only minor gender differences in the allocation of aid for education. A systematic analysis of development minister characteristics is thus still lacking.
Additionally, since both papers do not control for female heads of government, their empirical strategies come with the drawback of not capturing the pure effect of the minister's gender.
Appointing a female development minister could just be a proxy for women having control over government in general. 8 In order to identify a genuine effect stemming from the personal characteristics of the development minister, we control for the personal characteristics of the respective head of government and donor-country-fixed effects, or, alternatively, government-headfixed effects. Our paper thus not only provides the first test for the role of the personal characteristics of development ministers beyond gender for a large sample of donor countries, 9 we also offer a rigorous empirical strategy and the first analysis of the ministers' impact on the "developmentfriendliness" of donors' aid giving ("aid quality").
Our results show that some personal characteristics of development ministers matter. Most notably, more experienced ministers with respect to their time in office obtain larger aid budgets: One additional year in office increases the total ODA commitments by 0.7 percent. Additionally, we find that the share of quality ODA increases by 1.1 percentage points if development ministers possess prior professional experience in the field of development cooperation and by 0.2 percentage points for 7 For example, the development ministers are not full-ranked ministers in France (ministre délégué) and the United Kingdom (secretary of state). The German development minister has full cabinet rank but is the lowest ranked line minister according to German protocol. 8 Lu and Breuning (2014) control for the gender composition of governments in their analysis of the role of gender for aid generosity. However, they do not include donor-country-fixed effects so that observed effects may be driven by unobserved country characteristics. 9 Dreher et al. (2015b) analyze the role of the political color of both the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development and the Foreign Federal Office on German aid allocation.
each additional year in office. Moreover, aid quality is on average 1.0 percentage points higher if development ministers are female.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses how we expect the personal characteristics of development ministers to shape the quantity and quality of ODA and introduces our hypotheses.
Section 3 presents our novel dataset covering the characteristics of the 320 ministers that have been responsible for the OECD's development aid since 1967. Section 4 introduces the empirical approach and presents our results. The final section concludes and discusses avenues for future research.
HOW CAN DEVELOPMENT MINISTER CHARACTERISTICS AFFECT AID GIVING?

HYPOTHESES
Earlier work already suggests that the person leading the ministry of development shapes the aid rhetoric within donor countries. Specifically, Breuning (1995) finds that the minister's political affiliation has the potential to shape the debates in parliament in the three countries under study, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Investigating the case of Belgium specifically, Breuning (1999: 732) sees the development minister having "considerable latitude within the bounds of general policy directives." Anecdotal evidence also suggests that this latitude allows ministers to set the development agenda according to their background. Interviews conducted with employees from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development reveal that the ministry's work usually switches its focus when a new minister assumes office. 10 For example, the German development policy was perceived to have become more market-oriented when the Free Democrat Dirk Niebel took office. Tellingly, he advertised his ministry by stating that "[…] from every Euro spent on bilateral development cooperation, 1.80 Euro flow back to the German economy." 11 In the beginning of each year, the minister is responsible for the framework development planning, in which she or he decides how the aid budget will be allocated to countries, sectors and modalities. If development ministers possess sufficient power to shape decision-making, their personal characteristics should affect the quantity and quality of aid. In what follows, we discuss how we expect the gender, political ideology and experience of a development minister to affect aid giving. 10 Authors' phone interviews on 27 October 2014. We are grateful to employees from the German Federal Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation for these insights. 11 Grefe, Christiane and Jörg Lau, "Korruption tötet," zeit.de, 22 July 2011 (own translation), available at http://www.zeit.de/2011/30/Interview-Niebel/seite-2 (accessed 8 September 2015).
(a) Gender
Women and men show significant differences in their preferences. 12 Empirical evidence shows, for example, that government size and social spending increase as women obtain the right to vote (Lott and Kenny 1999; Aidt and Dallal 2008) . Funk and Gathmann (2015) observe for Switzerland that women are more likely to vote in favor of policies supporting environmental protection, health and social welfare as well as to oppose military spending. Togeby (1994) identifies a gender gap in foreign policy attitudes: women are on average more supportive of development aid (and less supportive of military interventions).
However, it is unclear whether such gender differences in individuals' preferences also translate into politicians' actual decision-making. 13 Strategic considerations, including party pressure or log-rolling, may prevent these differences from affecting policies (Funk and Gathmann 2015) .
Scholarly evidence is mixed on whether the described overall larger support of women for social policies-and development aid in particular-is reflected in legislators' decisions on aid policies.
While Breuning (2001) , Hicks et al. (2014) , and Lu and Breuning (2014) find that stronger female representation in parliament increases aid budgets, this finding is not confirmed by empirical evidence in Lundsgaarde, Breunig and Prakash (2007) . 14 Analyzing US congressional roll call votes, Olsen-Telles (2013) finds that female legislators are less likely to support military aid as expected, but-in contrast to expectations-they do not appear to be more supportive of economic aid.
Predictions are also not straightforward with respect to total ODA budgets when it comes to the role of female development ministers rather than parliamentarians. Independently of genderspecific differences in the ministers' stance towards foreign aid, ministers have a vested interest in maximizing their respective budget as a greater budget increases their chances of success as a minister (and should thus affect their chance of being promoted and re-elected). Consequently, there should be no significant difference in the size of aid budgets between female-led and male-led aid ministries.
However, empirical evidence points at systematic gender differences in negotiation outcomes, such as in salary negotiations, in which women are worse off than men (e.g., Gerhart and Rynes 1991) .
Explanations include, among others, women's lower willingness to self-promote, and negotiation partners, both male and female, who make lower offers to women since they assume the female negotiators to give in more easily than their male counterparts (Solnick 2001) . These findings based on business environments might also apply to political negotiations. Accordingly, it could be argued that male ministers successfully negotiate for larger aid budgets than female ministers. 12 Croson and Gneezy (2009) review experimental evidence on gender-specific differences in risk preferences, social preferences, and competitive preferences. 13 Empirical evidence in the development context suggests that this is the case (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Clots-Figueras 2011) . 14 Similarly, Fuchs et al. (2014) do not find the share of women in national parliaments to be a robust determinant of donors' aid generosity, as measured by the ODA-over-GNI ratio.
Turning to the specific allocation of aid, Hicks et al. (2014) find strong evidence of gender differences arising from larger female representation in parliaments: the level of the flows going to humanitarian efforts, education, health and social capital projects all appear to increase with stronger representation of women in national parliaments. Moreover, a higher share of women in a national parliament is also associated with more aid flowing to LDCs. One could thus expect that donor countries with female development ministers also provide a higher ODA quality than those with male development ministers. This would be consistent with evidence of gender differences in foreign policy attitudes discussed above (e.g., Togeby 1994) .
However, there are reasons to believe that such "female behavior" does not hold at the level of political leaders. Analyzing the role of gender in foreign policy, Koch and Fulton (2011) show that female representation in parliaments causes a decrease in defense spending and conflict behavior but they find the opposite effect for female defense ministers and government heads. In the words of Koch and Fulton (2011), "[w] hen it comes to masculinized leadership positions, like executive office, this challenge to gain credibility may lead women to present themselves as more masculine, in an attempt to combat the stereotype." Given that women face more barriers to access leadership positions, Jochimsen and Thomasius (2014: 394) , referring to Eagly et al. (1995) , note that "[i]f a woman must be 'twice as good as a man' in order to be appointed to a leadership position […] then women may be more effective leaders and superior performers compared to their male colleagues." Similarly, empirical evidence on monetary policy suggests that women take more "hawkish" decisions than their male counterparts (Farvaque et al. 2009) . Translating this to the case of development ministers, one might expect "tougher" behavior from female development ministers in negotiations over budgets and in their usage of budgets in the sense that they pursue a more self-interested development policy at the detriment of aid quality. This would imply larger aid budgets and a lower aid quality under female development ministers compared to years in which male development ministers are in office.
Existing empirical evidence on gender effects of development ministers, however, is rather weak. While Dreher et al. (2015a) find little evidence overall of a link between female representation in donor countries and a more gender-related need-or merit-based aid allocation, they show that female development ministers channel more aid to countries with low and unequal female tertiary enrolment, low and unequal female life expectancy, and with a higher share of women in parliament.
Analyzing a single aid sector (education), Kleemann et al. (2014) find only minor gender differences in aid allocation between female and male ministers. 15 15 Note that Kleemann et al. (2014) and Dreher et al. (2015a) do not control for the characteristics of the respective head of government, which may lead to spurious results as we outline below in greater detail.
(b) Political ideology
Scholarship has scrutinized the effects of government ideology on aid giving. Concerning the quantity of aid, a couple of studies have analyzed the role played by government ideology in donor generosity.
As summarized by Fuchs et al. (2014: 177) , "right-wing governments are often expected to provide less aid than left-wing governments since the latter have usually limited trust in markets and are more prone to redistribution." At the same time, it is argued that right-wing governments are more prone to provide larger aid budgets as they see aid as a tool to promote commercial and geostrategic interests (Fuchs et al. 2014 ). Thérien and Noël (2000) , for example, provide evidence for the first argument and find that social democratic governments are associated with higher levels of ODA in the long run.
Similarly, Tingley (2010) shows evidence that aid budgets increase when left-wing governments come to power. However, such a relationship does not appear to be conclusive. For example, Lundsgaarde et al. (2007) find political ideology to be insignificant, and, according to Bertoli et al. (2008) , right-wing governments provide even more aid. Analyzing German aid allocation, Dreher et al. (2015b) similarly find that aid commitments from ministries led by the Social Democrats are lower than those run by conservatives or liberals.
Since inconclusive results cast doubts whether there is a partisan effect at the level of governments, we also do not expect the political orientation of development ministers to systematically affect the size of aid volumes. We argue instead that ministers aim to maximize their budgets independent of their respective political ideology as in doing so they expand their political influence.
Beyond potential direct effects of government ideology, scholarship has shown that more fractionalized governments have larger government expenditures (e.g., Roubini and Sachs 1989) .
Government fractionalization also appears to be relevant in the aid context: a larger number of parties results in more compromises and more concessions being granted to each party (Dreher and Langlotz 2015) . Round and Odedokun (2004: 300-301) argue that "[t]he greater the lack of cohesion within the government (e.g., because it is a coalition of parties with more or less incongruent ideologies and policies), the greater the need to make more budgetary allocations for aid." While they also do not find a significant relationship between government ideology and aid budgets, their results show that more fractionalized governments provide significantly more aid. Diverging interests within the government should be particularly relevant in the aid context if the head of government and the development minister are associated with different political parties. We thus hypothesize that the quantity of ODA increases if the development minister and the head of government have different political ideological orientations.
In contrast to aid budgets, development ministers' political orientation might affect the quality of aid. Brech and Potrafke (2014) find that left-wing governments experience stronger increases in bilateral grant aid and grant aid to least developed and lower middle-income countries. This might suggest that left-wing governments provide a higher aid quality compared to right-wing governments as such an allocation pattern leads to lower future financial obligations for recipient countries and is more need-oriented. It has been argued that right-wing decision-makers are guided to a greater extent by domestic political and commercial interests than their left-wing counterparts who are expected to believe more in the merits of redistribution and have a more internationalist stance. 16 However, empirical evidence in this regard is mixed. While Fleck and Kilby (2006) find that development concerns in the United States matter more under a Democratic president and Congress compared to when the president and/or Congress are Republican, Dreher et al. (2015b) come to very different conclusions with respect to Germany. Analyzing German aid allocation, they reject claims that aid allocation by conservatives is guided to a larger extent by commercial and politico-strategic interests than aid from left-wing decision-makers.
(c) Technical experience
Prior research shows that the professional background of political decision-makers affects their decisions when in office. According to the empirical results in Göhlmann and Vaubel (2007) , for example, former central bank staff prefer lower inflation rates than former politicians after being appointed to central bank councils. 17 Dreher et al. (2009) find that entrepreneurs and professional scientists are more likely to implement market-liberalizing reforms compared to politicians with other professional backgrounds.
Based on these results, we expect professional background to also affect development ministers' decision-making. Specifically, prior experience in development cooperation, including work experience in aid agencies, development NGOs and embassies, among others, should influence the work of the minister having the main responsibility for development cooperation. There are at least two reasons why such technical experience could matter. First, politicians who have worked in the field could become more caring about development and thus direct more resources to developmentenhancing activities to the detriment of donor self-interests. 18 This should positively affect the quality of aid, which is largely under the development minister's influence, but not the quantity of aid, as greater development affinity does not necessarily translate into better negotiation skills at the cabinet (2013), however, do not find significant effects of the professional background of central bank governors on interest rates. They conclude that party affiliation rather than former occupation affects monetary policy. 18 Obviously, it should not only be the case that politicians with development experience become more development-oriented, more development-oriented politicians should also be more likely to go into the field in the first place. the success and failures of aid interventions. 19 We thus hypothesize that ODA quality is higher if the development minister has acquired professional experience in development cooperation.
Turning to education, the empirical evidence that specific educational background matters for political decision-making is much weaker than for prior occupations (Göhlmann and Vaubel 2007; Dreher et al. 2009; Jochimsen and Thomasius 2014; Moessinger 2014) . 20 Still, there are reasons to believe that a training in economics can make a difference when there is strong need for economic expertise such as in the context of economic development. In this regard, Hallerberg and Wehner (2012) find that countries with a high frequency of financial crises, such as Greece and Portugal, are more likely to appoint economists as economic policymakers than other OECD countries. Dreher et al. (2009: 170) identify a potential advantage of trained economists "in implementing reforms as they are more likely to distinguish good from bad advice and might be more able to resist the pressure of lobbying groups preferring the status quo." Similarly, economics-trained development ministers might be in a better position to implement effective development policies as they better understand the market mechanisms and market failures at play in developing countries and are thus better able to identify successful development measures. If this is true, we should observe larger aid quality when the development minister has obtained a degree of higher education in economics. At the same time, however, economists are found to be more selfish (e.g., Frey and Meier 2003) and might thus exhibit a stronger focus on donor self-interests to the detriment of aid quality. It is hence an empirical question which of the two countervailing effects of economics training on aid quality dominates.
Finally, to the extent to which economists are better bargainers, aid budgets of economicstrained development ministers should be larger. In line with this, Jochimsen and Thomasius (2014: 394) evoke the possibility that "trained economists […] are more successful in convincing their cabinet colleagues of sound budgets with low deficits," but they do not find empirical support for the hypothesis that the educational background of German state finance ministers influences the fiscal performance of the respective states. Similarly, debt-to-GDP ratios do not appear to be affected by the economics training of the finance ministers of OECD countries (Moessinger 2014) . Given the lack of empirical support for finance ministers, we also do not expect to observe larger aid budgets when economics-trained development ministers are in office.
Beyond ministers' technical experience acquired prior to taking office, their experience on the job could also affect aid giving. Usually, the political power of ministers increases with their time in office as they accumulate experience. Referring to finance ministers, Feld and Schaltegger (2010: 509) argue that a "minister who succeeds in remaining a long time in office usually enjoys a politically powerful position towards the parliament, the administration and the interest groups." Moessinger (2014: 185) assumes that "an experienced finance minister […] know[s] more about the schemes of his cabinet colleagues in attracting additional funds for their respective ministries." 21 Along similar lines, more experienced heads of other ministries should better know how to successfully secure funds for their respective budgets as they can more forcefully oppose the finance minister and more successfully compete against other cabinet colleagues. We thus expect ODA budgets to increase with the length of the tenure of development ministers. Moreover, more experienced development ministers should have acquired more knowledge over time on the types of aid that work. Assuming that development ministers want to increase the impact of development aid (out of humanitarian motives or career concerns), we expect that development ministers learn over time how to provide more effective aid and shift resources accordingly. If the incentives to build reputation increase with the time horizon (Besley and Case 1995) , development ministers with longer tenures should care more about donor performance. 22 Taken together, we expect the amount of ODA and its quality to increase with development ministers' political experience acquired through their time in office.
WHO ARE THE DEVELOPMENT MINISTERS? A NEW DATASET
We define "development minister" as the donor country's government member that holds the main responsibility for development cooperation. 23 We first identify the names and governing periods of all development ministers for the years in which the respective OECD-DAC donor reports detailed aid flows to the OECD's Creditor Reporting System (i.e., since 1967 at the earliest). 24 We collect the required data through internet research from publicly available sources, including government websites, the personal websites of the ministers, Political Data Yearbook interactive, 25 and Wikipedia, 21 Accordingly, Moessinger's (2014) analysis on public debt in Western European countries shows that the increase in a country's debt-to-GDP ratio declines with the respective finance minister's time in office. Studying the fiscal performance of German states between 1960 and 2009, Jochimsen and Thomasius (2014) find a significant decrease in budget deficits if the finance minister's tenure exceeds 4.7 years. 22 The chances to get promoted, i.e., to the head of government, increases with tenure and this shifts ministers' career incentives. See Feld and Schaltegger (2010) . 23 The respective cabinet member is either a minister, minister of state or secretary of state. In what follows, we use the term "development minister" for the sake of brevity. 24 We attribute years during which two or more development ministers are in office to the minister who is longest in power during that year. In six cases, however, two ministers were equally long in office (6 months). We then keep the minister being in office for the last six months in our dataset. 25 See http://www.politicaldatayearbook.com/ (last accessed 11 December 2014). among others. Where necessary, we contacted the ministries or other government institutions via email to gather additional information. Following the described procedure, we obtain a dataset with 957 observations containing 320 ministers for 23 OECD-DAC countries between 1967 and 2012, i.e., for a maximum of 46 years per country.
To be able to study how the personal characteristics of development ministers affect donors' aid giving, we then collect information on five personal characteristics of development ministersmirroring the hypotheses introduced in the previous section. First, we collect information on the Second, we gather data on ministers' political ideologies measured on a five-tier left-right scale. Bjørnskov and Potrafke (2011) use the social democratic party as an "anchor party," following the idea that its national branches are broadly comparable on the international level. They assign a value of 0 to social democratic parties and classify the remaining political parties accordingly.
Following their approach, we code the political ideology of development ministers with regards to the economic policy position of the political party they are affiliated with. 27 Specifically, a value of -1 is assigned to "unreformed socialist and communist," -0.5 to "modern socialist," 0 to "social democratic," 0.5 to "conservative," and 1 to "liberalist economic policy." 28 We find that the position of the development minister is-with 48 percent of all country-years covered-almost as equally often assigned to left-wing politicians (including social democrats) than to right-wing politicians (52 26 Julie Bishop assumed office in Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 2013 and thus became Australia's first female development minister. 27 In cases where ministers are not party members, we code their economic policy orientation based on other relevant information provided in their CVs (such as memberships in relevant associations). In the absence of such information, we code them in line with the respective head of government which has selected the respective minister. 28 In countries without a social democratic party, such as France for instance, we follow Bjørnskov and Potrafke (2011) and code ministers' parties relative to a fictional central party to keep the classification pattern consistent. We are grateful to Christian Bjørnskov for having generously provided us with their raw database that enabled us to translate their categorization of the ideologies of political parties to the case of development ministers. percent; see Figure 1b for details). No unreformed socialist or communist has been appointed over the time period under study.
Third, we collect information on whether the development ministers possess developmentspecific work experience when they take office. Specifically, we code a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the minister has gained professional experience in the field of development cooperation. 29 As can be seen in Figure 1c , a large majority of development ministers lack relevant work experience in the development context upon assuming office. Only 16 percent possess of any prior work experience in development cooperation when coming into power.
Fourth, the database includes information on whether the ministers have obtained a degree of higher education in economics or business administration. 23 percent of all ministers have received such training (see again Figure 1c ).
Fifth, in addition to ministers' experience prior to taking office, we also examine their political experience gained on the job. Specifically, we calculate the number of years a minister holds office in a given year, irrespective of whether the period in office was interrupted by another minister's term or not. Almost 15 percent of the ministers hold office for only one year, which demonstrates a relatively large fluctuation in the position. The average tenure of a development minister is 3 years. There is much more fluctuation in the office of the development ministers (320 ministers overall) compared to heads of governments (207). Luxembourg's Jacques Poos is the minister that gained most experience in office (15 years). Figure 1d plots the average tenure of ministers in power over time.
To sum up, the typical minister is male, stays in power for three years and cannot be clearly attributed to one of the two political camps of left or right. He has neither received economics training nor gained prior professional experience in development cooperation. Appendix A1 lists all development ministers covered by our database.
AND DO THEY MATTER? AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
(a) Empirical Approach
In order to analyze the role of development ministers in shaping the size and "developmentfriendliness" of a donor's development cooperation, we estimate the impact of the development ministers' personal characteristics on (1) the size of aid budgets (TotalODA), and (2) the quality of aid 29 We code professional experience in development cooperation as one if ministers have worked for international development organizations (e.g., the United Nations Development Programme), national development agencies (e.g., the Agence Française de Développement), or non-governmental organizations addressing development concerns (e.g., Médecins sans Frontières). Additionally, we code this variable as one if the development minister led the development ministry in a prior term.
(QualityODA). To account for TotalODA, we use a donor country's total amount of ODA in logarithms and measured in constant 2012 US$ (OECD 2014). 30 We analyze both ODA commitments and disbursements as both measures come with their respective advantages and disadvantages.
Commitments allow us to capture the impact that the development minister exerts directly on development policy. Disbursements in a particular year on the contrary may already have been committed under a minister's predecessor and thus falsely be attributed to the successor. The use of disbursements, however, comes with the advantage that one accounts for the development minister's influence on the current spending process. Moreover, points to the potential risk of overestimating aid when using aid commitments if ministers knowingly or unknowingly over-promise aid. Thus, only disbursements mirror the actual effort of donor countries. As can be seen from Figure   2 , ODA disbursements are systematically smaller than ODA commitments.
The measurement of QualityODA is not straightforward. Although several comprehensive indices propose various ways to measure the quality of ODA (Easterly 2002; Easterly and Pfutze 2008; Birdsall and Kharas 2010; Knack et al. 2011; , to our knowledge, none of these indicators have been computed for the years prior to 1995. In this paper, we make use of the qualityadjusted aid measure developed by since it is available for the longest time period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) and offers a convincing approach to analyze our research question. discounts gross ODA disbursements for several factors that are judged as reducing the effectiveness of aid. He first subtracts debt forgiveness grants and rescheduled debt from OECD-defined ODA to obtain his measure of "gross aid." He then adjusts the amount of "gross aid" by the extent to which a donor's aid is tied, by principal and interest payments, and by administrative costs. Finally, Roodman also rewards policies that are expected to increase a donor's development impact. Specifically, he implements a selectivity weight for ODA given to poorer and to well-governed countries and rewards tax policies that support charitable giving. The resulting measure of "quality-adjusted aid" is the amount of ODA that is estimated to be effective. As our measure of aid quality, we divide Roodman's quality-adjusted bilateral aid disbursements by his total bilateral gross aid disbursements. The resulting average values of QualityODA range between 18 percent for Japan and 56 percent for Sweden (see also Figure 2 ). 31 Figure 3 shows for four important donors how both TotalODA and QualityODA evolve over the terms of development ministers. 32 We regress our two dependent variables on the same set of independent variables, testing for a potential role of the ministers' gender, their political ideology, and their experience as captured by 30 Note that we add a value of US$ 1 to all ODA values before taking logarithms so as not to lose zero values in our sample. 31 In our dataset, Portugal constitutes an outlier as its aid quality is highly volatile and it is the only donor that shows a negative quality-adjusted ODA value in a year (1997) . This occurs as the country disproportionally supports richer recipients in that year. Hence, we set Portugal's value of QualityODA to zero in 1997. Note that our results below are robust to the exclusion of Portugal from our regressions. 32 In Appendix A3, we show for each individual donor how aid quantity and quality developed since 1967. their prior professional experience in development cooperation, education in economics, and time in office. 33 Our regression equations read as follows:
The index i refers to the respective donor country, t stands for the respective year, l allows for the three different measures of experience, and m identifies the 15 variables that form our set of control variables described below.
While we lag all independent variables in the TotalODA regression by one year, the variables enter simultaneously in the QualityODA regression. This is because development ministers should have the greatest influence on the country's total ODA budget during budget negotiations, which usually take place in the previous year, but their decisions simultaneously affect the usage of the ODA budget as captured by QualityODA. 34 In order to identify a genuine effect stemming from the personal characteristics of the development minister, we additionally control for the corresponding personal characteristics of the respective head of government. 35 The inclusion of these control variables prevents us from falsely attributing the influence of heads of government to development ministers. Such a correlation is most obvious for political ideology as the selection of the development minister by the head of government will be a function of their respective political orientations. 36 Female heads of government might also be more likely to appoint female ministers and a similar argument can easily be made for heads of government with professional experience in development cooperation or training in economics due to networks or affinity towards candidates with similar characteristics. Moreover, government-head and minister characteristics might also be interlinked in more complex ways. For example, to the extent to which left-wing heads of government are more likely to appoint female ministers (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005), a significant effect of the minister's gender might be driven by the political orientation of the head of government instead. Applying the same logic to the legislative, we 33 Although there are no clear expectations on how minister age could affect aid quantity and quality, we also explored a potential role of age. Since age never turned out to have a significant impact on either dependent variable, we excluded age from our specifications. 34 The contemporaneous impact of ministers on the specific use of aid budgets was confirmed by authors' phone interviews with employees of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development on 27 October 2014. 35 We build on the dataset in Bjørnskov and Potrafke (2011) , which is in turn based on Woldendorp et al. (2000) , to create a dataset on the characteristics of donor countries' heads of government. 36 This also applies to coalition governments since parties with a similar political orientation are more likely to build a coalition. The correlation between the ideology of ministers and heads of government in our sample is 0.656. additionally include the share of women in parliament (data from Brady et al. 2014 and World Bank 2014) and the mean ideological orientation of parliament members (data from Bjørnskov and Potrafke 2011) as control variables. Moreover, we construct a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the political orientation of the development minister and the head of government is different, as outlined in Section 2.
In the selection of the remaining control variables, we follow Fuchs et al. (2014) and Brech and Potrafke (2014) . Fuchs et al. (2014) survey the aid budget literature and analyze the robust determinants of donors' aid budgets using an extreme bounds analysis. Based on their findings (see Table 5 in Fuchs et al. 2014) , we include the lagged dependent variable, donors' (logged) per-capita GDP (World Bank 2014), a donor country's level of political globalization (Dreher 2006; ), a dummy for the existence of an aid agency in the donor country (Fuchs et al. 2014) , and the logged size of the population living in the donor's former colonies (Mayer and Zignago 2006; World Bank 2014) . Brech and Potrafke (2014) conduct a similar analysis to ours as they also analyze subcomponents of ODA. Following them, we further control for trade openness and government expenditure, both as a share of GDP (World Bank 2014). Finally, we add a donor country's debt-over-GDP ratio as it is a standard variable in the aid budget literature (Fuchs et al. 2014) . Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and Appendix A2 gives an overview of all variables used, their definitions and sources.
We estimate our baseline models with ordinary least squares (OLS) using donor-country-and year-fixed effects and standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the government-head level. Such a fixed-effects estimation that includes a lagged dependent variable may lead to inconsistent estimators and induce the so-called Nickell bias through the correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the error term (Nickell 1981) . However, with an average number of time periods per donor of over 35 years, the problem should be negligible in our TotalODA regressions and OLS appropriate. Since the time period covered in our QualityODA regressions is much shorter with a maximum of 17 years, we also show results from two further specifications: first, we exclude the lagged dependent variable; second, we correct the bias with the correction procedure developed by Bruno (2005a Bruno ( , 2005b for unbalanced dynamic panel models. 37 Finally, we also estimate regressions with the more conservative specification that includes government-head-fixed effects instead of donor-country-fixed effects. 37 Following Potrafke (2009), we choose the System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator, which is the most comprehensive estimator, to initialize the correcting procedure. However, Monte Carlo experiments show only marginal differences in the corrected estimates when the initializations change (Bruno 2005b) . This is in line with what we find (results are available upon request). Table 2 presents the results for aid budgets. We start by analyzing the results of a specification that excludes government-head characteristics (columns 1 and 2) and then add the personal characteristics of the heads of government as well as variables capturing the gender and ideological composition of national parliaments to make sure that we identify a genuine effect stemming from the characteristics of development ministers (columns 3 and 4). We examine both total ODA commitments (columns 1 and 3) and total ODA disbursements (columns 2 and 4). Our model has large explanatory power as evidenced by the R-squared of more than 80 percent. It is also reassuring that the results for the control variables are largely in line with expectations: we find evidence for persistent ODA budgets and for donors providing more ODA as they grow richer, as shown by the positive and highly significant coefficients on lagged DV and (log) GDP per capita. Openness and government expenditure enter with the expected positive sign but do not reach statistical significance at conventional levels in each specification. A higher debt-over-GDP ratio is associated with lower total ODA levels, at the one-percent level of significance. Political globalization shows the expected significant positive relationship with the quantity of aid, at least at the ten-percent level. The existence of an aid agency in the donor country is positively linked with total ODA disbursements (but not with commitments), at the one-percent level of significance. In line with Bertoli et al. (2008) , ODA budgets appear to work as substitutes for a colonial legacy, at least at the ten-percent level of significance.
(b) The Quantity of ODA
Turning to the interpretation of the results for our variables of interest, we do not find a significant relationship between the gender of development ministers (and heads of government) and
TotalODA. However, the coefficient on female parliament, i.e., the share of women in national parliaments, is positive and statistically significant at least at the five-percent level-in line with the findings in Hicks et al. (2014) . A one-percent increase in the share of female deputies in parliament raises ODA commitments by 0.7 percent and ODA disbursements by 0.4 percent on average (columns 3 and 4). This finding shows that female representation matters, but at the legislative not executive level (see also Lu and Breuning 2014) .
We also do not find a significant link between ODA volumes and development ministers' political orientation on a left-right scale of economic policy orientation. 38 This is in line with our expectations: ministers fight for an increase in their budgets independently of where they stand ideologically. Also, the political ideology of the heads of government does not appear to affect aid budgets-an unsurprising result given prior empirical research summarized in Fuchs et al. (2014) .
However, we again find differences between the executive and parliament. More economically liberal parliaments are associated with larger total ODA disbursements at the five-percent level of 38 Our findings are similar when we replace the five-tier-scaled variable with a simple dummy variable for rightwing ministers (conservative or economically liberal parties). Results are available upon request. significance. 39 Moving one ideological unit to the right-such as from social democratic to economically liberalist-increases disbursements by 23 percent. When we split the sample into the Cold War and post-Cold War period (see Appendix B, columns 3-4, for details), we find that the effect stems from the Cold War era. This finding casts doubts on widespread expectations that more rightwing parliaments provide less aid and thus corroborates similar results in Dreher et al. (2015b) .
Alternatively, this could also hint at right-wing politicians using aid during the Cold War more intensively as a geostrategic instrument than left-wing politicians.
The dummy variable ideological difference, indicating that the head of government and development minister have different political orientations, turns out to be positive and statistically significant at least at the five-percent level. Divided governments show an increase of total ODA commitments by 7 percent and of total ODA disbursements by 4 percent. This supports the view that diverging interests within the government causes each partner to grant the other partner more concessions (e.g., Dreher and Langlotz 2015) .
With respect to our experience variables, we find that ODA budgets increase with the tenure of the development minister, at conventional levels of significance (columns 1-4). More precisely, each additional year of experience as development minister increases ODA commitments by 0.7 percent and disbursements by 0.6 percent on average (columns 3 and 4). 40 Taking this at face value, Luxembourg's Jacques Poos in his 15 th year would have been able to secure an aid budget that is roughly 10 percent larger than that of a newcomer. As hypothesized, political experience appears to provide ministers with an advantage in their fight for higher budgets. There is also some evidence that political experience of heads of government has the opposite, negative effect on aid budgets, as evidenced by the negative significant coefficient on tenure gov. head in column 4 (at the ten-percent level). More experience in office seems to enable heads of government to better defend against demands for budget increases. An additional year of experience as head of government is associated with a reduction of ODA disbursements by 0.3 percent. In contrast to on-the-job experience, development ministers' prior professional experience in development cooperation (prof. dev. coop. minister) and training in economics (economics minister) do not seem to affect ODA budgets as none of the corresponding coefficients reaches statistical significance at conventional levels. On the contrary, we find evidence for larger aid budgets when the government is led by a trained economist.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 present regressions with government-head-fixed effects rather than government-head characteristics and donor-country-fixed effects. In this very strict specification, 39 This finding is not robust for commitments but holds when we exclude the lagged dependent variable (Appendix B, columns 1 and 2). 40 When we omit the lagged dependent variable, the effect increases to 1.3 percent (Appendix B, columns 1-2) . The finding appears to be driven by the post-Cold War period (Appendix B, columns 3-6). Given the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, the values above correspond only to the short-run effect of tenure. Taking account of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, we obtain long-run effects of 1.3 and 1.7 percent, respectively.
we only identify the possible effects of development minister characteristics on aid budgets through variation of development ministers within the tenure of each particular head of government. Focusing on the variables of interest for the sake of brevity, the results confirm our main findings from above.
Development ministers' experience in office appears to be the only relevant minister characteristic that plays a role for aid budgets. Tenure minister remains positive and statistically significant at the fivepercent level for ODA disbursements, while all other development minister characteristics do not reach statistical significance in this conservative specification.
The analysis so far has covered total ODA budgets, i.e., both bilateral and multilateral flows.
One may argue that development ministers have more direct control over bilateral aid budgets as they can only influence voluntary contributions to multilateral organizations among multilateral aid flows but not core contributions, which are binding in principle. 41 When analyzing bilateral ODA budgets (see Appendix B, columns 7-8, for details), we obtain similar results with respect to female parliament and different ideologies as both are significantly positively associated with bilateral ODA budgets.
There is again, albeit weaker, evidence of a positive association between ministers' tenure and ODA disbursements.
To sum up, the development ministers' personal characteristics do not seem to matter much with regards to the quantity of ODA. Only one finding appears to be largely robust: a longer time in office strengthens the ministers' ability to negotiate higher ODA budgets. The appointment of more experienced ministers can thus help countries to achieve the UN target to provide 0.7 percent of GNI as development aid. Political experience seems to pay off. Table 3 shows our results for ODA quality. We begin our analysis with specifications that exclude the lagged dependent variable (columns 1 and 2). While the regression in column 1 additionally excludes government-head and legislative controls, these variables are included in column 2. Starting with the interpretation of the results for the control variables, the coefficient on (log) GDP per capita is positive and reaches statistical significance at the five-percent level. High-quality ODA thus seems to be a luxury good: as countries become richer, incentives to provide self-interested aid shrink. In line with this explanation, a larger debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with significantly lower ODA quality (at the one-percent level). Government expenditure on the other hand is associated with higher ODA quality, suggesting that governments with higher expenditure have more experience with redistribution. Openness does not have a significant relationship with ODA quality. ODA quality decreases with the degree of political globalization and the existence of an aid agency, both at the ten-percent level of significance. While the effect of political globalization is surprising as one would expect more globalized countries to embrace a greater role in international development, aid agencies have higher administration costs which might harm the share of quality ODA. Finally, the positive and highly significant coefficient on (log) colonial history suggests that stronger ties with developing countries could give former colonial powers insights into where aid will be most effective and how to channel their aid more efficiently.
(c) The Quality of ODA
Turning to our variables of interest, we find a positive association between female minister and the quality of ODA, which is statistically significant at the ten-percent level in column 2.
Interpreting the size of the effect, we find that ODA quality increases by 1.0 percentage points when a woman directs development policy. Even though this effect is not of a large magnitude and only corresponds to US$ 28 million of additional quality ODA annually when holding gross aid constant, the result supports the idea that women and men differ in their preferences. Strikingly, however, the coefficient on female gov. head has the opposite sign and is statistically significant at the five-percent level. Specifically, we find that ODA quality decreases by 2.4 percentage points when a woman leads government. Women in the highest political position might feel the urge to overcome the gender stereotype as discussed by Koch and Fulton (2011) . Consequently, female heads of government might support more self-interested aid giving than their male counterparts. 42 The insignificant coefficient on female parliament suggests that no comparable gender difference exists at the legislative level. We conclude that gender differences in aid quality cannot be generalized and depend on the specific position under analysis.
With respect to political ideology, we find no significant relationship between our variables and the quality of ODA. This non-finding applies to development ministers, heads of government, the ideological differences of the former and latter, and also to the ideology of parliamentarians. We conclude that the quality of ODA is independent of the political ideology of the relevant decisionmakers.
Continuing with development ministers' experience, we find that ministers' professional experience in development cooperation as well as their experience in office matter for the quality of ODA. According to column 2, ministers with specific development experience succeed in increasing aid quality by 1.1 percentage points. Assuming gross aid to be constant, the average donor provides US$ 30 million of additional quality ODA annually if a development minister with such a background comes to power. Accordingly, we find some support for our hypothesis that ministers with development experience deliver higher quality ODA-either because they have acquired knowledge of how aid can be more effective or because they have a higher intrinsic motivation to give quality 42 The comparison of regressions that exclude (column 1) and include (column 2) government-head and legislative controls supports our decision to include these variables. In column 1, female minister supposedly absorbs part of the negative effect of female gov. head, leaving female minister with an insignificant and less positive coefficient than in column 2.
ODA. Also, development ministers shift more resources to "development-friendlier" activities as they gain experience on the job. One additional year in office raises the share of quality ODA given on average by 0.2 percentage points, amounting to US$ 4.7 million for the average donor (column 2).
Among the three variables capturing the ministers' experience, economics minister is the only one not to reach statistical significance at conventional levels. Economists thus neither appear to be more selfish in the sense that they provide lower quality aid, nor more able to raise aid quality. Also, the corresponding government-head experience variables do not reach statistical significance in our regressions.
The lagged DV reaches statistical significance at the five-percent level when we include it in column 3. The quality of aid thus appears to be path dependent although the relationship is weaker than for aid quantity. The results for most control variables are similar compared to the specifications excluding the lagged DV in columns 1 and 2. Only gov. expenditure and political globalization lose statistical significance at conventional levels. Most notably, our findings for the minister characteristics are robust and the statistical significance of female minister, prof. dev. coop. minister and tenure minister actually increase from the ten-percent to the five-percent level. 43 Since the average number of years per panel is 16 when using donor-country-fixed effects with lagged DV (column 3), we correct for the Nickell bias in column 4 by applying the Bruno (2005b) correction procedure explained above. As the bias adjustment with instrumental variables requires bootstrapped standard errors, we run 50 repetitions following Potrafke (2009) . While all coefficients in column 4 are similar in magnitude when compared to column 3, only the lagged DV, the debt-to-GDP ratio, (log) colonial history and female gov. head remain statistically significant at conventional levels. When we introduce government-head fixed effects in column 5, the lagged DV is the only control variable that continues to have a significant relationship with aid quality. The loss in significance in column 4, however, is explained by the bootstrapping procedure rather than by the bias adjustment itself. With up to five repetitions, our results from column 3 stay robust and even increase their level of significance (results are available upon request). We are thus reassured that our results are meaningful, even though they do not survive all robustness tests.
Summing up, we find evidence that the ministers' gender and experience matter for ODA quality. As hypothesized, development ministers' experience, in the form of prior professional experience in development cooperation and within their office, increases the quality of ODA.
Although female ministers appear to provide higher-quality ODA, the opposite is true for aid given during the terms of female heads of government. This finding thus cautions against generalizations 43 This is the only specification in which right-wing gov. head becomes statistically significant. Governments led by right-wing politicians seem to provide an aid quality that is 2 percentage points higher according to column 3. This finding is the opposite of our expectation that right-wing politicians might link more domestic economic benefits to aid, leading to lower ODA quality. However, we do not put much emphasis on this finding as the coefficient is only significant at the ten-percent level and does not hold in any other specification. about gender differences in aid giving and highlights that such differences depend on the specific position in the political hierarchy being considered. However, most of these findings lack robustness to specifications using the bias adjustment for unbalanced dynamic panels and government-head fixed effects. We find no evidence that ministers' ideology or an education in economics affect ODA quality.
CONCLUSIONS
Development ministers play an important role in determining aid outcomes but the importance of their role in this office often goes unnoticed by their home country. According to a poll conducted in September 2014 by Forsa, only 2 percent of Germans know that Gerd Müller is their development minister. 44 Almost two years after the French development minister Pascal Canfin took office in May 2012 (and shortly before he was removed again), a French news magazine still listed him among the "unknown ministers." 45 In sharp contrast to the disinterest in development issues in many governments, parliaments and the general public, aid decisions taken at donor ministries can have huge impacts on the ground as DAC countries alone provide more than US$ 100 billion annually to the developing world. Building on the burgeoning literature on political leadership, this paper is an attempt to assess how the personal characteristics of the government member responsible for development cooperation ("development minister" in short) affect the quantity and quality of ODA.
To examine this research question, we introduce a novel database covering all development ministers of OECD-DAC countries since the OECD started reporting detailed ODA flows in 1967.
The outcome is a dataset covering 320 ministers, active in 23 countries over 46 years. Using panel econometric models, we then estimate the impact of development ministers' personal characteristics on (1) the size of aid budgets, and (2) aid quality as operationalized by the foreign-aid component of the Commitment to Development Index (CDI). Specifically, we test the role of the minister's gender, political ideology, prior professional experience in development cooperation, education in economics, and time in office. In order to identify a genuine effect stemming from the personal characteristics of the development minister, we control for the corresponding personal characteristics of the respective head of government as well as donor-country-and time-fixed effects. As a test for robustness, we also run regressions with government-head-fixed effects.
Our results show that experience matters. In line with our expectations, we find that the minister's political experience as measured by their time in office plays an important role for the quantity of aid: one additional year in office increases total ODA volume by 0.7 percent (controlling for the total ODA volume of the previous year). More experienced ministers are thus more likely to raise their countries' aid level closer to the UN target to provide 0.7 percent of GNI as development aid. With respect to the quality of aid, one additional year in office raises the share of quality ODA by 0.2 percentage points. Ministers with prior work experience in the field of development cooperation provide on average 1.1 percentage points larger share of quality ODA than ministers that lack such experience. Moreover, female ministers appear to be more successful in providing quality ODA than their male counterparts: the share of quality ODA increases by 1 percentage point when women lead the ministry responsible for development cooperation. However, these findings for aid quality lack robustness to specifications using the Bruno (2005a) procedure to correct the Nickell bias.
We thus conclude that some of the development ministers' personal characteristics influence aid giving but they do not matter much overall. This finding stands in contrast to the significant impact that scholars have found for the characteristics of heads of government, central bank governors, and finance ministers. Why are development ministers different? There are several potential explanations for this. First, an extensive strand of literature has shown that development aid is allocated due to national geostrategic and commercial interests (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000; Fleck and Kilby 2010; Dreher et al. 2015b ). The defense of national interests ties too closely into the agenda of heads of government and parliamentarians and this might limit the room for development ministers to maneuver. This explanation would be in line with our finding that the gender and ideological composition of parliaments and some of the government-head characteristics are statistically significant in our regressions. Second, our analysis shows that it is not the ideology of ministers or heads of governments that directly matters for the quantity of ODA, but rather diverging ideologies that play a role. This finding hints at the important role of the negotiation process within governments that deserves closer investigation.
We leave several questions for future research. Since the importance of non-DAC donors in international development cooperation is rapidly growing (e.g., ), future research should analyze the role of development minister characteristics in these donors' aid policies. Given that most of the big emerging donors are non-democratic and have weaker institutions than their DAC counterparts, the role of minister characteristics in these countries might be larger as a result of the fewer checks and balances that they have in place. Moreover, it would be necessary to test our explanations as to why ministers' characteristics do not show the expected effects by including variables capturing, for instance, donors' geostrategic or commercial interests. This undertaking would require a dyadic study design, including donor and recipient countries. Finally, future research could delve deeper into the role of ministers' professional backgrounds and test whether their prior professions affect the sectoral allocation of ODA. 
Political ideology
Right-wing minister Political ideology of development minister (liberalist economic policy (1), conservative (0.5), social democratic party (0), modern socialist (-0.5), unreformed socialist and communist (-1)) Own construction following Bjørnskov and Potrafke (2011) Right-wing gov. head Political ideology of head of government (liberalist economic policy (1), conservative (0.5), social democratic party (0), modern socialist (-0.5), unreformed socialist and communist (-1)) Own construction following Bjørnskov and Potrafke (2011) Right-wing parliament Average political ideology of all parliament members (liberalist economic policy (1), conservative (0.5), social democratic party (0), modern socialist (-0.5), unreformed socialist and communist (-1)) Bjørnskov and Potrafke (2011) Ideological difference 1 if political ideology of development minister and head of government is different 
